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Abstract 
An expanding institutionalist literature on professional service firms (PSFs) emphasizes that 
these are ridden by contradictions, paradoxes and conflicting logics. More specifically, literature 
looking at PSFs in a global context has highlighted how these contradictions prevent firms from 
becoming truly global in nature. What it takes to make partner in the Big 4 is at the core of such 
interrogations since partners belong to global firms yet are promoted at the national level. We 
undertake a cross-country comparison of partner promotion processes in Big 4 PSFs in Canada, 
France, Spain and the UK. Synthesising existing institutionalist work with Bourdieusian theory, 
our results suggest that PSFs in different countries resemble each other very closely in terms of 
the requirements demanded of their partners. Although heterogeneity can be observed in the way 
in which different forms of capital are converted into each other, we show there is an overall 
homogeneity in that economic capital hurdles are the most significant, if not the sole, criterion 
upon which considerations of partnership admissions are based. 
 
Introduction 
Recent research on Professional Service Firms (PSFs) has produced a vista in which institutional 
complexity, competing rationalities and organizational paradoxes are prominent landmarks. This 
research, exploring PSFs in a global context, has shed light on the way in which local 
institutional and regulatory mechanisms constrain the implementation of global work systems 
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and practices. In short, the local professional environment places fetters on the globalising 
professional service firm. Notable contributions to this literature include Muzio and 
Faulconbridge (2013), who draw attention to the dual existence of both transnational and 
national institutional practices in global law firms. This resonates with Barrett et al.’s (2005) 
study of Big 4 accounting firms which demonstrates how global audit methodologies are 
routinely distorted when appropriated at the local level. Similarly, Malsch and Gendron (2013) 
report the co-existence of both order and disorder within Big 4 PSFs, a situation that is said to 
preclude the emergence of stable organizational archetypes. Adopting a more regulatory 
perspective, Suddaby et al. (2007) describe the emergence of a transnational governance regime 
in the field of professional accounting. This new regime, Suddaby et al. (2007) contend, does not 
displace national regimes but instead is superimposed upon them. The corollary of this is 
institutional complexity. Resonant with this line of thinking is research on multinational 
management consultancies, a key insight of which is that these firms’ aspirations to be globally 
integrated are chronically thwarted by local institutional factors (Boussebaa, 2009 and Boussebaa 
et al., 2012). 
 One general conclusion that can be evinced from extant institutional analyses of PSFs is 
“the recognition of the possibility of the coexistence, copenetration, sedimentation, and 
hybridization of different institutional, managerial, occupational, and organizational logics” 
(Muzio et al., 2013: 703). An important theme reprised in the literature is that paradoxes, 
contradictions and competing pressures prevent PSFs from becoming truly global. We refer to 
these arguments as the ‘institutional heterogeneity thesis’. This intellectual position provides a 
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refreshing counterfoil to anodyne suggestions, often emanating from the firms themselves, that 
PSFs can offer seamlessly integrated services to their clients throughout the world.  
 Tempering the enthusiasm of the hyper-globalists, it is equally important not to overstate 
the paradoxes and hybrids of their critics. The notion of international firms being more integrated 
into global networks than their immediate locales (Mueller and Loveridge, 1995) or that global 
logics significantly shape local work practices (Ferner et al., 2004; Mueller, 1994) is not new. 
Indeed, although providing evidence of heterogeneity on one level, Boussebaa (2009) does 
question whether this is generally over-emphasised in institutionalist studies (see also Ferner, 
Edwards and Tempel, 2011, Mueller, 1994). It may well be the case that complexity and 
paradoxes reign during times of institutional change. It is important to note, however, that we are 
perhaps no longer witnessing an institutional field that is nascent but is, rather, now mature 
(Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006) or better established, at least in the case of professional 
accounting.   
 Moreover, while many of the studies highlighting heterogeneity have examined 
multinational PSFs, they have not been in multi-country settings. There has been a curious 
absence of any substantive comparative work in this area, especially when contrasted with the 
burgeoning literature on varieties of capitalism (see Walker, Brewster and Wood, 2014 for an 
overview of this literature). Indeed, recent articles have explicitly called for further research to 
remedy this: For example, Boussebaa et al. (2012) make the case for more work comparing PSFs 
in different countries. Further, Boussebaa et al. (2012) suggest that their work on consultancy 
PSFs be extended and tested through analyses “other types of professional service firms such as 
accountancies, law firms, advertising agencies and recruitment or head-hunting firms” (482). 
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One response to this call has already been offered by Muzio and Faulconbridge (2013) who 
similarly conclude their analysis of English law firms in Italy by arguing for more 
comprehensive comparative research: 
“Particularly fruitful here would be multi-comparative studies looking at how 
the same home-country practices (such as the one firm model) are introduced in 
different host country jurisdictions (i.e. Germany and France) and the different 
tensions and outcomes that such processes generate” (22).  
Our paper responds to these calls for research by presenting the results of a multi-country 
comparative study of Big 4 accounting firms. Looking at Big 4 firms in Canada, the UK, Spain 
and France, we aim to draw inferences regarding the extent to which these firms in particular, 
and PSFs more generally, can be thought of as homogenous or heterogeneous across different 
geographical and cultural contexts. Specifically, we explore this broad theoretical concern 
through an analysis of what makes someone ‘partnerable’ in the Big 4. The rationale for focusing 
on promotion processes is that they constitute a central activity in the organization of 
professional service firms. The decision to make someone a partner is to induct them into the 
firm as a ‘joint owner’ and to place trust in them as having the capacity to ensure the future 
growth of the firm. In short, it is a critical decision for a Big 4 firm. Promotion processes may 
well be appropriated locally and differ from, even contradict, global prescriptions regarding 
access to partnership, all the more since partners are co-opted at the country level. Based on 
interviews with partners and professionals who might be considered close to partnership, we 
analyse the key criteria for making partner across geographical contexts, considering how these 
criteria are applied in practice. Particular attention is paid to the differences and similarities that 
arise when comparing different countries.  
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 This analysis is informed by drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, as well as being 
informed by extant institutional literature on PSFs. We believe that a Bourdieusian perspective 
can enrich the institutional debate on homogeneity/heterogeneity notably thanks to concepts such 
as ‘the field’ (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012) and different forms of capital. Institutional field 
analysis does not, we argue, pay sufficient attention to the ways in which different forms of 
capital effectively stratify participants and practices within fields. Specifically, such an approach 
permits an interrogation of the homogeneity/heterogeneity dynamics at play in PSFs vis-à-vis our 
research object - partner promotion processes. Overall, our Bourdieusian approach leads us to 
question the extent to which heterogeneity prevails in professional service fields.   
 The paper proceeds as follows. The following section identifies the precise theoretical 
concerns that this study seeks to address. This is followed by a discussion of our research 
methodology. Subsequent to this, the results of the empirical analysis are presented. We show 
that partner admission processes are largely homogenous in their ends but more heterogeneous in 
their means across different firms and geographical contexts. Overall, we show that partner 
admission processes follow a global logic of making income expand for all but a national logic 
of determining how various types of capital are converted into economic capital. We then discuss 
the findings in light of their implications for research into global PSFs and conclude by outlining 
some potential avenues for future research.  
 
Theoretical context: an institutionalist sociology of the professions 
Institutionalist work on PSFs 
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Large amounts of literature point towards heterogeneity as a salient feature of global PSFs. In 
accountancy, it has been highlighted that commercial and traditional professional logics co-exist 
in the Big 4 (Gendron, 2001; 2002) and even that professional and commercial values are wed 
together in a sort of marriage of convenience: “the two [logics] depend upon one another for 
their success” (Malsch and Gendron, 2013: 893), implying that one can never fully dominate the 
other. In other words, although the Big 4 have come to dominate the wider field of accounting of 
which they are part, they have not done so via concomitantly elevating the accumulation of 
economic capital as the main raison d’être of accounting services. One might be led to believe 
that accounting remains something of a field of restricted cultural production (Bourdieu, 1996) in 
which accounting services are, to some extent, undertaken deontologically for their own sake 
rather than as a means to a financial end. Similarly, although looking at a different type of 
heterogeneity, Barrett et al. (2005) describe the way in which local auditors in Big 4 firms 
appropriate global systems in ways that are indeterminate, leading to significant differences in 
the way that audits are carried out in different geographical contexts.  
 This documenting of institutional heterogeneity is apparent in institutional work in other 
professional jurisdictions as well. For example, Muzio and Faulconbridge (2013), drawing on 
Kostova’s (1999) notion of ‘institutional duality’, describe a process of de-mergers, lawyer 
exoduses and clashes with local regulators which effectively undermines the ability of a law firm 
to operate homogenously in different countries. Dezalay and Garth (2004) suggest that Magic 
Circle lawyers in the US are more commercial and client-focused than their Magic Circle 
counterparts in the UK, the latter upholding to a greater extent traditional professional values 
such as distance from the client. Boussebaa (2009), looking at multinational consultancies, 
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defines these organizations as “sites of conflict between competing rationalities emerging from 
distinctive national institutional contexts” (829). In addition, these organizations are subject to 
inter-unit conflicts which lead the author to question whether “PSFs can become truly integrated 
global networks” (ibid., 846). In a related study, Boussebaa et al. (2012) show how consulting 
firms, although adopting a global discourse, “were in reality far from having transcended 
national boundaries” (479), again questioning the extent to which multinational PSFs are truly 
global. Regan (2005) documents the co-existence of both commercial partners (“rainmakers”) 
and technical partners (“non-rainmakers”) in the legal field, with the latter taking on the 
overflow of work from the former. Similarly, Briscoe and von Nordenflycht (2014) outline the 
bifurcation of strategies for making partner in law firms into ‘rainmaking’ and ‘inheritance’ 
paths, showing how certain strategies map on more effectively to individuals depending on 
gender and other demographic criteria. 
 
Towards a Bourdieusian conception of professional fields  
Heterogeneity therefore abounds in institutionalist field analysis. To some extent, it may be that 
these descriptions of heterogeneity are arrived at as a result of the theoretical lens adopted rather 
than the raw force of the empirical analysis. Indeed, it has been argued that, in the case of cross-
national research, institutional analysis tends to favour the highlighting of national differences 
(Smith and Meiksins, 1995). Bourdieusian, rather than instutionalist, field analysis emphasises 
stratification (Savage et al., 2005) or processes of domination as opposed to a more benign co-
existence of multiple logics. In this respect, attention is paid to the way in which powerful actors 
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come to dominate global fields and facilitate the privileging of certain factors over others (Go, 
2008). Essentially, Bourdieu’s thinking can complement institutional theory by introducing 
notions of power and politics into what has all too often been an insufficiently critical theoretical 
space (see, for example, Oakes et al., 2008, Cooper et al., 2008 and Willmott, 2011, for 
arguments to this effect).  
 Bourdieu-inspired analyses of different professional contexts have, in fact, abounded in 
recent years (cf. Haynes, 2012; Jewel, 2008; Kay and Hagan, 1998; Kurunmaki, 1999; 
Pinnington and Gray, 2007). Such analyses lead to a sceptical view of professionalism as a 
struggle to naturalise the arbitrary via the accumulation of professional prestige (Schinkel and 
Noordegraaf, 2011). Whereas institutionalist thinking on professionalism focuses on 
conformance with professional ‘norms’ as an end in itself, Bourdieusian thinking on 
professionalism views the accumulation of professional prestige (symbolic capital) more 
critically as a means to some other end (Go, 2008). Indeed, by using Bourdieu to understand 
professions we are uniquely placed to introduce power back into institutional theory given that 
professions “are the most influential contemporary creators of institutions” (Clegg, 2010: 9). 
Specifically, Clegg (2010) argues that institutionalist studies ignore power by failing to draw 
attention to what is absent. In the case of the accounting profession, which enjoys monopoly 
service provision in key areas such as audit, a central concern in this regard is whether 
professionals embrace extra-economic commitments to the public interest or, to use Bourdieu’s 
terms, whether the field is autonomous vis-à-vis the wider economic field (Bourdieu, 1996). 
 These criticisms of institutional theory have been recognised by scholars who have 
attempted to bridge institutionalist work with, for example, Gramsci (Levy and Scully, 2007) and 
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critical realism (Leca and Nacache, 2006). Our recourse to Bourdieu represents a further attempt 
at such bridging, yet in a way that is perhaps more consistent with the foundational concerns of 
institutional theory. One can find major Bourdieusian influences at the very roots of new 
institutional thinking (DiMaggio, 1982). For example, Paul DiMaggio and Woody Powell note 
the "natural affinity" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 38) between new institutional sociology and 
Bourdieu. This affinity is especially pronounced with the concept of field, even though this tends 
to appear “in an unattributed and often rather watered down form” (Bourdieu, 2005: 2) in 
institutional theory. Acknowledging this, current developments within institutional theory 
(Fligstein & McAdam, 2011) recognise the importance of Bourdieu and seek to develop an 
understanding of fields through a very careful dialogue with Bourdieusian ideas. In synthesising 
Bourdieu with institutional theory here, we seek to contribute theoretically to an emerging 
‘institutionalist sociology of the professions’ (Muzio et al., 2013). 
 Specifically, a Bourdieusian field is a “set of objective, historical relations between 
positions anchored in certain forms of power (or capital)” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 16). 
As such, field analysis requires understanding who rises to the top of certain fields and what 
forms of power sustain such position takings. Broadly, actors’ positions within a given field are 
sustained by the possession and accumulation of economic capital (money), social capital 
(personal and professional networks and connections) and the multifarious cultural capital which 
denotes in broad terms the ways in which an individual is cultivated but can encompass anything 
from specific professional competencies through to the ability to contemplate an avant-garde 
work of art (Bourdieu, 1979). Understanding what the key criteria are for making partner in the 
Big 4 lies therefore in, firstly, understanding which species of capital are most highly valued in 
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the field and, secondly, how these species are accumulated (Bourdieu, 2012). We expect all three 
varieties of capital to be significant in understanding what makes someone partnerable. For 
example, it has been shown that social capital in the form of networking is crucial in securing 
career advancement in the Big 4 (Anderson-Gough et al., 2006). In addition, we can also expect 
economic capital to be of some importance given the increasing importance of commercial 
concerns in the profession (see, for example, Barrett et al., 2005). As for cultural capital, we 
expect it to be primarily institutionalised (Bourdieu, 1986) in the form of diplomas or certificates 
and embodied “in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body” (Bourdieu, 1986: 
247), meaning that it denotes a particular way of behaving or interacting with others.  
 The choice of where to draw the sociological parameters around a field is a 
methodological decision (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011: 3). The concept can be applied at 
multiple levels, although in institutional theory the concept is generally applied at the ‘meso-
level’. In such a case a particular industry could constitute a field or a professional service line 
such as accounting (see, for example, Malsch and Gendron, 2013), with the Big 4 as the 
dominant players or incumbents (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011: 6). Firms themselves can also be 
considered fields in their own right (Bourdieu, 2005) and that may be appropriate for analyses 
limited to one particular organisation. It has been argued, for example, that the organization has 
replaced national professional associations as the primary site of professional regulation and 
identity formation (Anderson-Gough et al., 2000; 2006; Cooper and Robson, 2006).  
 Suddaby et al., 2007 depict the emergence of a transnational regulatory field in 
professional services, which is dominated by Big 4 accounting firms and transnational, rather 
than national, organisations. Suddaby et al. (2007) contend that the Big 4 have outgrown their 
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national professional bodies and now largely control a transnational governance regime through 
international accounting associations such as the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) and the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) (see also Covaleski et al., 2003). 
The Big 4 accounting firms have been aided by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the 
creation of a global market in professional services: the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) negotiations created a single market for auditing and accounting services, which are 
legally enforced by the WTO. Coming full circle, the Big 4 were themselves major advisors to 
the WTO on creating a global market for professional services (Arnold, 2005: 309).  Given this 
domination of transnational governance regimes, rather than viewing the Big 4 as the major 
players within a wider field, we view the Big 4 as a field in its own right.  
 That said, although a provisional understanding can be determined a priori, fields can 
only be defined on the basis of empirical research. Specifically, one must consider the way in 
which different capitals interact within the Big 4 field. In particular, we are interested in 
understanding the capitals that are valued within the Big 4. As a result, we decided to focus on 
how our interviewees talked about the process of attaining a partnership in the Big 4. A partner, 
as discussed above, is a senior position at the strategic apex of the firm. Those that attain 
partnership could be credibly viewed as possessing the ‘correct capital’. To this end, we seek to 
answer the following research question: 
 To what extent do promotions to partner in the Big 4 privilege the same forms of capital 
in different countries? 
 
The particular phenomenon of partner promotions should be revelatory vis-à-vis the wider 
composition and homogeneity (or otherwise) of the field because partners represent the most 
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successful individuals within the Big 4. Given that being successful in most fields is essentially a 
conformist process (“excellence, in most societies, consists in playing according to the rules of 
the game”, Bourdieu, 2012: 2), one could conclude that those who rise to the top of their fields 
embody more fully the capitals which are most highly valued by the surrounding field. In turn, 
analysis of who makes partner in the Big 4 in different countries, and why, should reveal the 
extent to which homogeneity prevails in terms of the leadership and raison d’être of Big 4 firms 
in those countries. Put differently, for a cross-national comparative study such as this 
homogeneity implies that global forces dominate, whereas heterogeneity implies the prevalence 
of national-societal factors. Of course, the global and the local are both present and interact with 
each other to influence professional work (Smith and Meiksins, 1995). We are interested in the 
particular nature of these interactions across countries and in identifying any differences in the 
composition of partner capital portfolios.  
 
Research methods and methodology 
Given the exploratory nature of the research question, a qualitative approach was elected. To that 
end, a series of interviews were undertaken with senior figures in each of the Big 4 firms in order 
to explore the different types of capital considered valuable for partnership therein. Big 4 firms 
represent a productive context within which to explore issues of homogeneity/heterogeneity 
because, as mentioned above, they constitute a mature professional field. The comparative study 
was undertaken across four different countries: Canada, the UK, Spain and France. These 
countries were chosen on the basis of both the locations and cultural/linguistic affinities of the 
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authors as well as the coherence that they offered with extant literature that distinguishes 
between Anglo-Saxon and continental models of professionalism (see, for example, 
Faulconbridge and Muzio, 2007 and Morgan and Quack, 2005).  
 We interviewed overwhelmingly partners (48 out of 64 interviewees were or had been 
partners) and other senior professionals close to partners such as directors or senior managers (10 
interviewees out of 64) assuming they might offer us insight into what makes them think of 
themselves as partnerable or not. We are, however, well aware that partnerability starts being 
shaped before senior management levels (see for instance Kornberger et al. (2011) on the 
identity shift of managers in the Big 4). For this reason, we also interviewed a limited number of 
trainees or managers (6 in total). Table 1 breaks down the interviewees by country and rank, and 
Table 2 breaks down the interviewees by firm.  
[Tables 1 and 2 here] 
The 64 interviews were conducted between December 2010 and May 2014. They lasted between 
30 minutes and 5 hours, although the majority lasted around 90 minutes. The focus of these 
interviews was on the perceived requirements of and roles performed by partners in the Big 4. 
Beyond this, interviewees were also asked to outline their career histories with special attention 
placed upon the process of becoming a partner, or what it takes to become a partner for those 
who were not partners at the time of the interview. Given Bourdieu’s interest in the distinction 
between inherited and accumulated capital, interviewees were also probed on their educational 
and family backgrounds. In this way it was possible to determine rough proxies of class origins 
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as well as institutionalized cultural capital. In keeping with the exigencies of the comparative 
method (Lamont, 1992), the same interview guide was used in each country under study.  
 All of the interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim with the exception of one 
individual who objected to this; in this case the interviewer made detailed notes during the 
interview. The interviews were undertaken by multiple researchers, although the coordination of 
interview guides and analysis was managed by the lead author. Host country authors undertook 
the interviews but the lead author listened to each recording and read each transcript in 
conjunction with the host country authors. The analysis was undertaken in an iterative process, 
following the chronological collection of the data. The majority of the Canadian and UK 
interviews were undertaken between 2010 and 2011 and these were analysed initially. The 
original intention was to undertake a comparative study across these two countries alone. 
However, initial analysis of the transcripts found a remarkable lack of significant difference 
between the two countries in terms of both the process of being promoted to partner as well as 
the capital portfolios of the partners themselves. In a search for greater diversity, the study was 
therefore extended to include both Spain and France, enlisting additional research team members 
from those countries. The data was collected in Spain and France between 2012 and 2013 and 
analysed iteratively. These continental European interviews focused on the main themes to 
emerge from the UK and Canadian study, namely, the dominance of economic capital and the 
different ways in which other forms of capital were converted into economic capital. In 2013, it 
was decided that additional interviews be undertaken in the UK in light of the novel insights 
emerging from the French study vis-à-vis the unequal importance of educational capital in career 
ascension. During the various stages of data analysis on-going conversations were maintained by 
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all researchers around these themes. The coding and ensuing empirical narrative essentially 
emerged out of these conversations.  
 The analysis of the empirical data is presented in the following section. In order to protect 
anonymity of both individuals and firms, a unique numerical identifier has been given to each of 
the 64 interviewees. This identifier appears in the quotes below along with the country of the 
interviewee.  
 
Some capitals are more equal than others 
Given the extensive number of works documenting the existence of multiple logics (Barrett et 
al., 2005; Boussebaa, 2009; Malsch and Gendron, 2013) we expected the discourse of 
interviewees to be littered with discussions of both the commercial aspects of their work and the 
technical-professional aspects. What we found was, in fact, an overwhelming emphasis on the 
former and virtually nothing on the latter. When the latter was talked about it was generally in 
pejorative terms. For example, those with technical skills might be described as “second-class 
citizens” (7, Canada), or as “geeks” (18, UK).  Our interviewees did not generally see themselves 
as accountants so much as entrepreneurs or members of the “international business elite” (UK, 
22): 
 They [partners] see themselves as part of an international business elite. They spend a lot 
of time with clients, they travel a lot, a lot of the work is global so they will travel to 
other countries. Yes. And they will look at themselves and say I’m part of the business 
elite (UK, 22). 
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Descriptions of themselves as ‘professional accountants’ tended to be in the past tense. One 
interviewee, a qualified CA and KPMG stalwart, noted that every decade he had listed a different 
occupation on his census form: from chartered accountant through to corporate financier (UK, 
14). Partners are primarily interested in business development and, by the time they reach partner 
at least, rather uninterested by the technical aspect of audits which they describe using the 
language of compliance, norms and risk management as though it was a constraint on their 
agency. Whilst ‘technical partners’ still exist, they appear to be a dying breed and, more often 
than not, are restricted to non-equity positions, i.e. salaried positions that are much less lucrative 
than their profit-sharing, equity partner colleagues: 
‘that’s not what it was like 30 years ago. The ones that actually progressed to the 
highest levels in the firm tended to be the ones that were technically the 
strongest. Aye, the tax whiz, maybe never had a client, didn’t even know a 
client, had never put a bill out in his life, hugely bright, massive brain. Now by 
definition, with guys like me kicking around, it’s almost the opposite’. (UK, 63) 
In the extract, a managing partner reflects on the ‘ideal’ partner when he joined the firm, who 
tended to be gifted technically, but less strong at client management or income generation. This 
implicit rejection of the identity of the professional accountant is important because the 
institutional heterogeneity thesis implies that national regulatory contexts require differential 
adaptation on the part of global firms (Muzio and Faulconbridge, 2013). In the context of 
accounting, this might manifest itself in differing relationships with national accounting standard 
setters. Yet partners did not recognize the importance of an in-depth knowledge of accounting 
standards or keeping up to date with regulatory changes. Indeed, it was often stated that this type 
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of work was the preserve of subordinates rather than that of well-rounded businessmen such as 
themselves. For example, 
Sometimes you have very competent people under you and you can sell 
something without being necessarily the expert on the subject. (60, France) 
 
A French partner (58) told us how, when promoted to senior manager, he was taken to the side 
by the managing partner and told that an overt focus on developing his technical skills would 
limit his career prospects. Although technical capital (a form of specific cultural capital) is 
necessary but insufficient for making partner, being too technical can bring with it the curse of 
negative symbolic capital: it taints you as ‘not partner material’.  
 In each country, making partner was understood starkly in terms of an individual’s ability 
to win new work and to grow the business.  One managing partner in the UK (13) talked merely 
about ‘good guys’ (those who make partner) and ‘bad guys’ (those who are not partner material). 
When pressed on what was meant by a ‘good guy’, it was revealed that this denoted someone 
who can grow the business. The main criterion, rather than the plural criteria, for making partner 
was often put very simply: 
What we have in our head as partners is that you need to be able to leave the 
firm bigger than when you entered as partner. (44, Spain) 
So if you want to make more money, you have to appoint the people you 
need to make more money. (8, Canada). 
 
PSFs such as audit firms share the specificity of electing people as partners who will then share 
in the capital of the firm. Partners decide each year with whom they are willing to share their 
cake. They all mention the fact that new partners have to make the cake bigger.  
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The first thing we look at is [the candidate’s] commercial skills. Dilution [of 
profit-per-partner] is a real concern for us… if partners don’t bring in 
revenue, the partners’ committee will lose money because there is less to 
share in the end…. So the capacity to make business grow obviously matters 
a lot. (60, France) 
 
One is co-opted as a partner if he or she is able to bring in fees through new accounts and, if not, 
he or she faces the real threat of being demoted or asked to leave the firm: 
The partner role is a pressurised job. I have made guys up to partner and 
then spoken to them 2 or 3 years later and said ‘this is not really working’, 
and encouraged them to find something new. And actually in 2 of the 
instances where I have done that they have really breathed a sigh of relief 
because they were getting more and more under pressure. There is pressure 
to get work coming in. (14, UK) 
 
Phraseology such as ‘business development’, ‘get work coming in’ and ‘leaving the firm bigger 
than when you entered as partner’ is, whilst clear in its designation of what is important, still 
rather vague in terms of specific requirements. Interviewees were therefore pressed in terms of 
what exactly such phrases meant. Although not asked to be specific about financial figures, 
interviewees nevertheless freely proffered the clear financial hurdles that need to be overcome if 
one is to make partner. These hurdles were remarkably consistent across boundaries, indicating 
that, in spite of local rejection of global appraisal processes (see below), perhaps global 
prescriptions did indeed play an important factor after all. For example, more than one Canadian 
partner suggested that $3m per year in terms of revenues are what partners need to bring in. UK 
interviewees routinely cited £2m whilst French partners quoted €3m as the revenue requirements 
placed upon partners
i
. Partner earnings are not based on a ‘lock-step’ model, meaning that they 
relate to years of service and experience, but on a ‘you eat what you kill’ (19, UK) basis. They 
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are also, overwhelmingly, national partnerships
ii
. There is significant variation in terms of what 
partners earn both within national contexts (the average profit per partner for PwC UK in 2012-
13 was £705 000; their CEO took home £3.6m, Accountancy Age) and across them (see also 
Boussebaa et al. (2012). These differences notwithstanding, it was clear at least that those below 
partner level needed to demonstrate the ability or potential to bring in these sorts of revenue 
figures. 
 Our analysis clearly demonstrates that economic capital was the most important species 
of capital in explaining what makes partners co-opt their peers. Interestingly, this economic 
capital relates to the capacity of accountants to generate it rather than through using pre-existing 
capital – through family money, for example - to buy into a partnership. The capacity to generate 
economic capital is, following Bourdieu, the result of converting other forms capital as part of 
their ascension to partnership. The process by which the firm grows, develops or makes more 
money can be understood in Bourdieusian terms as the conversion of both cultural and social 
capital into economic capital. We will discuss these conversion processes below after 
considering the way in which national/regional offices rejected the formal, global appraisal 
systems for partner candidates. 
 
Consistent rejections of global appraisal processes 
Each firm interviewed possessed a formal appraisal process for all staff and a separate appraisal 
process for making partner. These processes varied slightly from one firm to another but were 
identical in the case of the same firm across different geographical contexts. In each firm, the 
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global level has some influence in the co-option process. However, this influence is usually 
limited to numerus clausus decisions.  If the annual number of co-options in each country is 
decided on a global level, the names of who will be elected partner are still decided by local 
partners (on a country basis) and ratified later globally.   
 Some attempts to monitor the identification of partners-to-be at a global level were 
identified by our interviewees. For instance, one partner described a new ‘partner track’ for star 
senior managers. The objective is that 80% of new partners be appointed through this process. 
However this global programme welcomes people who are designated locally. Only 
professionals who have already been recognized locally as partners-to-be are sent on the global 
level ‘partner track’. So there is an interaction here between the global and the local, although as 
we will see below, local appropriation of the process paradoxically served to reinforce global 
imperatives. However, some interviewees were, on the surface, skeptical about the formal global 
appraisal system. As one partner explained, the influence of global processes is indirect and 
related to the standardisation of partners’ profiles: 
Now, with the creation of the [track], you have commissions, you must put 
together files, you go through 15 interviews, it lasts 3 months… well. It 
certainly makes the topic more secured, but it does not really make a difference 
in the end, except that atypical profiles might be more difficult to support… 
(53, France) 
A major common theme to emerge was the extent to which formal evaluation processes were 
adopted in a merely symbolic fashion. KPMG, for example, have a ‘4 dial’ model which is used 
to appraise partner candidates. The 4 dials, which collectively are deemed to reflect well-rounded 
professionals, are as follows: 
1. Growth – denoting revenue generation and client obtention and retention 
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2. Delivery – denoting technical competence 
3. Community – denoting representation of the firm in the business community and 
involvement in philanthropic activities 
4. KPMG for life – denoting HR management and the mentoring of junior colleagues 
 
Each ‘dial’ is measured out of 4 and whilst, officially, anyone can make partner provided they 
obtain a minimum of 14/16 in total, we were told in different countries that 4 on the ‘growth’ 
dial was, informally, an absolute necessity. Indeed, attention was not always paid to the other 
dials at all. For example, take the following description offered of a fellow partner by one 
interviewee:  
I mean, he was a sexual harassment suit waiting to happen, you know ... but 
... he brought in work and so we brought a balanced score card and so he gets 
marked down on everything other than business growth and of course our 
Board said, “Yes, yes, I hear what you’re saying. Yes, that’s fine. We’ll give 
him loads more money because he’s really creamed the business up.” (UK, 
62)  
The ritualised nature of formal evaluation processes is present at any level, as witnessed by the 
managing partner of a UK office: 
We have a huge appraisal process. So I appraise these guys. I have 144 bodies 
that work for me. Your average partner-to-staff ratio is probably about 10:1. 
We do it twice a year, one to one. We don’t need a fancy form to do it, I know 
how to do it, but we do have a fancy form and we are told to use it. (13, UK) 
 
This cynicism about the globally formalized process is, at first glance, indicative of the local 
appropriation of partner promotion processes. Indeed, this interviewee went on to state explicitly 
that his office diverges significantly from the formalized process: 
There is a point at late manager, early senior manager when you start to 
formulate your views. I know the guys out there who have leadership 
potential and who don’t…What they can show you on paper will make it look 
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very organised and structured. We have everyone ranked. But what actually 
happens in practice...is totally different. (13, UK) 
 
Each year, partners meet in order to agree on a list of names. Officially, they base their decision 
on the annual ratings of senior managers and on the quality of the latters’ written application 
(usually known as the “individual case”, which contains self-evaluation from the candidate and 
evaluations by a mentor and/or the manager of the corresponding area). In fact, decisions are 
made on a much more informal basis as illustrated in the following quote from a French partner 
which is laced with heavy irony: 
First of all, they put people into two categories, those who won’t make it and 
those who will make it, who constitute the long list. For those who will make 
it, there is a second round to establish the short list of those who will be 
proposed this year to the partners’ votes. This round is organized by an 
independent evaluator… so independent that he doesn’t know the candidate, 
doesn’t interrogate those who have worked with the candidate, …totally 
independent [laughs]… Stays in his office and writes the evaluation on his own 
[laughs]. 
Interviewer: So it means he doesn’t have any influence? It is decided 
elsewhere?  
Yes, 90%, yes. (52, France) 
 
Partners similarly described how formal rankings were carried out on partner candidates but that 
these were not actually used when making the decision of who would make partner and who 
would not. Rather, the managing partner would hold a ‘consensus meeting’ with the other 
partners where they would decide who to promote and who to pass over. One managing partner 
described this process as very easy to manage: 
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And, usually, usually, personally, in the last ten years, it's so evident who, who is 
number one and who is number two.  Or there might be two people they call, so 
that's more difficult.  But, usually, there's always a distinction. (8, Canada). 
 
Thus, the overall rejection of formal global appraisal processes was not indicative of institutional 
heterogeneity. The informal local appropriation was, rather, homogenous across different 
contexts, boiled down to the rather Darwinian criterion of who can increase the size of the 
economic cake. Ferner et al. (2011) have remarked that formal rejection of appraisal systems 
often leads to hybridization and the diversion of a practice from its normal function (178). This 
was not the case here; rejection actually re-enforced the disproportionate influence of economic 
capital. 
Heterogeneous circuits of capital conversion 
If economic capital represents the ultimate objective of partners and, by extension, of their firms, 
then other forms of capital become subservient to that. Otherwise stated, social and cultural 
capital are valued only in so far as they are convertible into economic capital. Essentially, 
partners make their living by undertaking such conversion processes on a regular basis. The 
following quote is broadly representative of how cultural capital (a relevant “tax idea”) and 
social capital (personal network and relationships) are converted into service fees (economic 
capital): 
Interviewer: How does one actively go out and win work?  
Interviewee: A whole combination of things. [British City] is a very small 
place. Lots of people know lots of people. The finance community, the 
bankers, the investment managers, lots of people know each other. It is hard to 
imagine becoming a partner without explicitly tapping into that and becoming 
part of it. So…you might have a particularly good tax idea for private equity 
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funds, so you would identify on your patch who were the private equity funds 
or who were the companies that were owned by private equity funds and you 
would go out of your way to…we don’t cold-call, but in a firm like [ours] there 
will be someone who can give you a warm introduction, so that warm 
introduction, together with a targeted, relevant idea, you will then be able to 
sell the benefits of it and maybe sell the project. (18, UK) 
 
This example of how a tax partner goes about winning new work is emblematic of how different 
forms of capital are deployed and converted. The social capital of the partner is evident in his 
connections with the finance community and the investment managers as well as internally in 
terms of who can give him a ‘warm introduction’. This gives him access into a potential client 
whom he must then impress with his specific cultural capital of technical expertise which is 
embodied in the ‘tax idea for private equity funds’. If he successfully sells the idea, then his 
social and cultural capital have been successfully converted into economic capital. In turn, this 
process will have boosted the accountant’s symbolic capital.  
 Different forms of capital interact during putatively extra-curricular activities such as 
sport as well as via strictly professional networks. For example, take the following quote from a 
manager in Spain:  
A lot of my bosses [partners] run marathons and there they meet clients. In fact, 
there is a [firm name] running club that sometimes sponsors races; in the past 
there was also a [firm name] golf tournament. (47, Spain) 
 
The objectives of patronising such events are multiple, including the socialization of trainees and 
general investment in the firm’s brand. Such events, however, were often highlighted by partners 
and others as ways in which social capital with clients can be generated, accumulated or 
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consolidated, all with the teleological objective of converting this social capital into future 
economic capital. 
 The above are quintessential examples of capital conversion processes in the UK, Canada 
and Spain. They are representative specifically because they refer to both social capital and 
cultural capital that has not been inherited, but accumulated over time as a result of working in 
the same firm for several years and developing a reputation both internally and externally. The 
capacity to interact with clients, during meetings or at sports events, and sell them new ideas are 
things that individuals entering the Big 4 as trainees are not already endowed with. They are 
things that have been accumulated and, crucially, once accumulated become valuable for those 
who possess them. France was different in this respect. Although processes of capital conversion 
were broadly similar in France, we identified through the course of our study that educational 
capital – a sub-category of institutionalised cultural capital – played a key mediating role in the 
conversion of cultural and social capital into economic capital. In this sense, inherited capital – 
in the form of educational credentials obtained prior to entering the firm -  was more valuable 
than accumulated capital. 
 Most of the French partners that we interviewed were the products of one of the elite 
French Grande Ecoles (those among “Groupe A” as they are labelled in each of the Big 4 firms 
in France, including HEC, Polytechnique or Sciences Po among a few others). As was explained 
to us, each of the Big 4 has recruitment quotas for these institutions and pay higher starting 
salaries to their graduates, even if most interviewees claim that the lower salaries are all made up 
for at the level of senior manager. Educational capital is so important that partnerability is 
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projected onto the graduates of these Grandes Ecoles in French offices of the Big 4. They are 
encouraged to think of themselves as partnerable from the very outset of their careers:  
In a home like ours, you are looked at differently if you come from HEC, 
you have more rights… because there is the HEC committee, because the 
boss comes from there, well not the current one, … anyway, people imagine 
your career… It happens to me to be introduced as « Jean, HEC » to big shot 
partners. (France, 60, name changed) 
Educational capital is, at times, automatically converted into social capital. This process is quite 
different from the case of the Big 4 in Canada, Spain and the UK.  
 In PSFs, individuals gain visibility depending on their assignments. As we see from the 
following quote, some accounting firms place recruits from Grandes Ecoles on distinctive 
assignments: 
We would not restrict them to audit assignments. We were paying a little 
more attention to their planning and offering them other types of 
assignments such as transaction services or consulting. We tried to appoint 
them on assignments abroad. […] As soon as they come in, they are 
pampered and we try to propose them more diverse assignments or 
assignments having more added value than the classic audit. […] It implies 
that these people are served first, when plans are set up. (France, 52) 
Not only do graduates from Grandes Ecoles gain visibility on “value-added” assignments, they 
also have the opportunity to interact very early with well-known partners in the firm who will, in 
turn, potentially become a significant source of future support for them. Thus the firms actively 
seek to build the social capital of Grand Ecole graduates. Similarly, as alumni, graduates from 
Grandes Ecoles are very involved in recruitment sessions occurring at their former schools. This 
represents another occasion to build a network. As one partner explains below, this enabled him 
to interact early on with key partners in the firm: 
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As an HEC alumnus, you are sent on HEC forums because they want to 
recruit HECs… So you are more naturally led to mix with … Personally, I 
was very quickly involved in recruitment. At this occasion, you come across 
people off-the-record, people who are managing partners of the firm, right 
away. (France, 60) 
Educational capital is not only important for building internal social capital; it also helps building 
external social capital with clients. The importance of having a sufficient number of partners 
who had attended one of the elite schools was highlighted by one partner, himself an ESSEC 
graduate:  
We are worried when we don’t have enough ‘parisiennes’ [Top schools in group 
A]. I find that daft but in this firm we always have the illusion that if you haven’t 
been to a ‘parisienne’ then you can’t be a partner. That said, given that the 
clients of tomorrow will have studied at the same place, it is better to have them. 
(France, 53) 
The above quote, which illustrates how cognisant the French firms are of the importance of 
hiring ‘parisennes’, is striking. It signals a bifurcated career track for French recruits stemming 
directly from their institutionalised cultural capital. Related to this, we were told that educational 
capital actually becomes more important at the partner level. This contradicts our initial 
expectations that the influence of educational capital would diminish in the years after 
recruitment. In other words, educational capital does not merely reduce barriers to entry into the 
Big 4, it also seems to be a significant criterion for recognistion as a member of an elite at top 
management level. If we try to trace the influence of educational capital from junior to partner 
levels, it is obvious that graduating from elite schools impacts far more than the mere starting 
salary: 
[The fact that I am an HEC alumnus] starts to matter again as a partner. […] 
Among my clients, a lot ask me about my educational background, which was 
not the case before in fact […] Either they ask it directly or I have the feeling I 
come across more and more people who graduated from HEC the same year as 
28 
 
me. They are not necessarily my direct contacts at the clients but it happens that 
I come across them in presence of my main contact and in that case I’m told: 
“ah! You graduated from HEC!” (France, 52) 
This quote illuminates the intersections between educational capital and social capital. The 
importance attributed to educational capital is not out of any cultural snobbery, but a wholly 
rational concern about capital convertibility. It is easier for graduates of the Grandes Ecoles to 
interact with each other and so future sources of revenue will come through the conversion of 
this educational capital into, first social capital, then economic capital.  
 Surprisingly, we did not, by a long way, find such elitist backgrounds in the case of 
Canada, the UK and Spain. Big 4 partners there were generally the product of state schooling 
systems rather than the rarefied atmosphere of elite universities. In the UK, for example, there 
was only one Oxbridge graduate in our sample and he actually never made partner, leaving the 
Big 4 at Senior Manager level citing cultural dissonance as a key factor. In Bourdieusian terms 
he felt as though he did not have the requisite embodied cultural capital to ‘fit in’. Interestingly, 
as an Oxford PPE graduate, with serious literary interests, he felt that his broad social and 
cultural capital were disadvantages within the field of Big 4 accounting. Similarly, in Spain, 
where business leaders ritually pass through elite business schools such as IE and ESADE, we 
found a predominance of provincial, public university graduates among the partners interviewed. 
In Canada we did not find any preponderance of overly prestigious education either. France, 
however, stood as a case apart in the premium placed upon educational capital in the Big 4 there. 
There is thus a real difference here between France and the other countries studied in terms of 
the value placed upon the educational capital of both new recruits and partners (see Maclean et 
al., 2010: 338-339, for a similar discussion about the different educational backgrounds of the 
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French and British business elites more generally). In Canada, the UK and Spain, the cultural and 
social capital of partners are painstakingly built up over long periods of time. Partners are made 
by the firms they belong to (Covaleski et al., 1998), typically over an 11-16 year period; partners 
are not born with those attributes. In France, partners are also made by their firms in terms of 
developing their professional habitus, but a significant part of their cultural and social capital is 
inherited directly from the school system (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1964). In this respect, the Big 
4 in France are more analogous to Magic Circle firms in London (Cook et al., 2012) or big U.S. 
law firms (Heinz and Laumann, 1982; Jewel, 2008) in terms of the educational capital of their 
partners than they are analogous to their counterpart offices in Canada, Spain and the UK.  
 
Discussion and conclusions  
Our study found that promotion to partner in the Big 4 follows a homogenous global logic of 
generating large amounts of economic capital. This is balanced by a heterogeneous national logic 
where there are stark differences in terms of how educational, cultural and social capital are 
converted into economic capital. In a complex dialectic, both global and local effects combine to 
reshape institutions (Smith and Meiksins, 1995). Our results suggest that the local is subservient 
to the global. For all their attachment to established patterns of elite formation, to inherited rather 
than accumulated capital, the French Big 4 are no less commercial than their counterparts in 
Canada, Spain and the UK. The objectives of the Big 4 in France are precisely the same as in 
other jurisdictions. The historical French commercial mind-set, which privileges gentlemanly 
conduct over efficiency or effectiveness, referred to as la logique de l’honneur (D’Iribarne, 
1989), does not ultimately prevail in this context. Therefore, exceptions of a second-order aside, 
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the extent to which partners resemble each other in terms of the attributes and dispositions that 
they have to embody suggests that Big 4 PSFs are indeed, in fundamental ways, globally 
homogenous. This run counter to the ‘institutional heterogeneity’ thesis which posits that the 
multiple logics that run throughout firms undermine the possibility of PSFs ever becoming truly 
global (see, for example, Boussebaa, 2009; Boussebaa et al., 2012 and Muzio and Faulconbridge, 
2013). Multiple logics do indeed exist, but it is clear that the commercial logic, in the form of 
economic capital, dominates.  
 By documenting how different forms of capital effectively stratify participants and 
behaviours within the Big 4 field, this paper introduces a critical edge to institutionalist work on 
the professions, following what Muzio et al. (2013) have labelled an ‘institutionalist sociology of 
the professions’. A Bourdieusian perspective allows us to understand how the contours of a field 
actually work, it helps understand the ‘rules of the game’. For instance, our study reveals what is 
‘absent’ (Clegg, 2010) here, namely any extra-economic commitment to the public interest. 
Accounting is not therefore done ‘for accounting’s sake’ as would be the case in an autonomous 
field (Bourdieu, 1996) but as an instrumental means to an end. In fact, the cultural capital of 
technical expertise often functions as negative symbolic capital in the upper echelons of the Big 
4, marking individuals out as ‘second-class citizens’ (Canada, 7) who are unable to be fully 
entrepreneurial. Formal appraisal processes putatively encourage the development of rounded 
professionals who have a public service and collegial ethos. However, in practice, candidates 
who are a ‘sexual harassment suit waiting to happen’ (UK, 62) will still become partner, even 
super-partners who are paid more, provided that they bring in more money for the firm. The 
lionisation of such individuals does not sit easily next to the vociferous public interest discourse 
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articulated by Big 4 firms when called upon to justify their de facto monopoly of audit provision 
(Whittle, Carter and Mueller, 2014). 
 How do we explain this homogeneity? As an initial explanation, the Big 4 has simply 
matured/established itself much more as a field in recent years. In their study of a nascent ‘Big 6’ 
firm in the 1990s, Ferner et al. (1995) showed the tensions that emerged in the traditional 
partnership organizational form when PSFs internationalized. In order to prevent national 
partnerships from undermining international coherence, different elements of a ‘corporate glue’ 
were applied by international offices. These included the rolling out of best practices by 
international offices, intra-firm networking, international secondments to gain experience, 
international training courses and the use of integrated software and intranets. These were all 
conducive towards a strengthening of the corporate glue. However, this standardisation or 
corporate glue can be weakened by various factors including, inter alia, language differences 
across borders, recent mergers with an equally large and culturally heterogeneous firm, 
diversification of services and divergence of national interests (see also Ferner et al., 2011). 
There was thus a real tension between the global and the local in Big 6 PSFs in the 1990s; 
indeed, many older partners we interviewed made explicit mention to the political tensions that 
existed in firms during that period. However, this is decreasingly the case. All of the elements 
that strengthen the ‘corporate glue’ and thus that are conducive towards homogeneity are more 
vociferously practiced today than they were 20 years ago: standardisation of knowledge sharing, 
training and service delivery are important means through which the Big 4 seek to manage their 
risk profile. Conversely, the elements that can serve to weaken the corporate glue are in many 
ways less relevant now than they were 20 years ago: English dominates as the working language 
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in these firms in a way that is viewed as unproblematic, disruptive mergers with competitors 
have been displaced by acquisitions of smaller players in the field who are more easily absorbed 
into existing structures and national interests appear to have successfully converged around 
making as much money as possible. Granted, service lines continue to emerge and degrees of 
specialization are becoming more acute, although the formal linking of cross-selling metrics to 
remuneration possibly encourages more co-operation than competition. Overall, Big 4 firms are 
more internationally coherent now than they were 20 years ago in the (then) Big 6 and therefore 
more able to transcend national boundaries.  
  So Big 4 firms are themselves more tightly glued together, but why does a particular 
type of homogeneity prevail, namely the overwhelming importance of economic capital? We 
would argue that the global diffusion of partner promotion processes is heavily laced with the 
cultural contingencies of dominant States (Smith and Meiksins, 1995). Dominant States in this 
respect constitute the Anglo-American countries that gave birth to both the accounting profession 
and the Big 4 PSFs. These firms are now incredibly powerful institutional actors, forming part of 
a wider global managerial elite (or the ‘international business elite’ (UK, 22) to use their own 
language) which is at the forefront of globalization (Ferner et al., 2011). The Big 4 PSFs in 
particular have managed to successfully rewrite the transnational ‘rules of the game’ of 
accounting standards and frameworks (Muzio et al., 2013). This constitutes a double victory for 
the Big 4: they exercise symbolic domination over what constitutes legitimate accounting, 
defining it in their own image. In turn, this effectively obliges multinational clients to turn to the 
Big 4 for guidance on how to interpret the regulatory rules of the game. At this global level we 
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see clearly the interplay of different capitals, with the Big 4 converting their symbolic capital of 
professional prestige into economic capital.  
 In turn, these supra-national governance structures serve as a strong homogenizing force, 
both at the level of work practices within the Big 4 and in the wider global economy as well. 
Economic capital dominates during partner promotion and appraisal processes precisely because 
these supra-national governance structures have been set up in order to convert symbolic into 
economic capital. Organizational work practices are therefore a reflection of this global victory 
in governance. However, the homogeneity that we have witnessed here at the organizational 
level has even farther reaching effects when it manifests itself at the level of global economic 
activity beyond the Big 4 themselves. That International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
reflect largely Anglophone understandings of how to account for things is a well-established 
argument (Ramirez, 2012). IFRS has been mandatory in the European Union since 2005 and is 
hastily being adopted around the globe. This is controversial because IFRS impose a particular 
way of organizing upon institutions; ways of organizing that contain all sorts of sociologically 
unacceptable, and anthropologically deaf, assumptions about individual rationality, shareholder 
primacy and market efficiency. To say that the Big 4 merely reflect Anglo-American commercial 
doxa would therefore understate the case. The Big 4 are not a mere product of globalization but 
key engineers of it; they are globalization’s hired guns (Dezalay and Garth, 2004) playing a 
crucial role in the realization of globalization’s specific Anglo-American form. By occupying a 
central position in transnational governance arrangements that proselytise the increased 
harmonization of accounting techniques across borders, the Big 4 effectively clothe naked 
34 
 
economic interests in juridical justifications, behaviour which is entirely characteristic of those 
charged with unifying the wider global economic field (Bourdieu, 2005).  
 We have looked at Big 4 PSFs in an attempt to contribute to the literature on PSFs more 
generally. We have attempted to show that a Bourdieusian field approach, which focuses on the 
convertibility of different types of capital rather than conformance with institutional norms, can 
enrich our understanding of both the work practices of PSFs and the role that PSFs play in 
processes of globalization. However, the study suffers from a number of limitations in this 
regard. Given that a large part of our explanation of the results is provided by reference to 
institutional changes within the field of accounting  specifically, it may well be that our findings 
are not fully generalizeable to other professional jurisdictions such as law or even to mid-tier 
accountancy firms where it has been shown that technical capital is still highly valued (Lander et 
al., 2013). Nor might the homogeneity observed here be observable in non-western contexts 
where the Big 4 operate. Equally, our concern about absent discourses might not extend to 
jurisdictions such as management consultancy, whose legitimacy does not rest upon public 
interest claims in the same way as in traditional liberal professions such as law or accountancy. 
Further, whilst there are good reasons to look only at partners in that they might be thought of as 
most representative of the dominant capitals at play within firms, our inferences regarding the 
differing values of different species of capital might not be extendable to more junior employees. 
More heterogeneity might be observable, even within the confines of the Big 4, if looking at a 
cross-section of different employee grades. Indeed, there has arguably been insufficient work on 
professions looking at how actors at lower levels shape their surrounding fields (Adler and 
Kwon, 2013). Finally, it is possible that our results are specific to firms in the midst of a global 
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economic crisis who temporarily have to devalue the embodied cultural capital of technical 
professional expertise and augment the value of any type of social or cultural capital that is 
readily convertible into economic capital. Of course, these limitations are hypothetical and would 
warrant empirical interrogation. Such interrogations would be best undertaken via comparative 
work that compares different professional jurisdictions, different countries and different 
employee levels. 
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Table 1: Interviewees by country and rank 
Country Partners Below 
Partner level  
Total 
Spain 12 4 16 
France 11 2 13 
UK 15 8 21 
Canada 10 2 12 
Total 48 16 64 
39 
 
 
Table 2: Interviewees by firm 
Firm Number of 
interviewees 
Price Waterhouse Coopers 12 
KPMG 22 
Deloitte 13 
Ernst & Young 8 
Anderson (formerly Big 5) 3 
Other (non-Big 4) 6 
Total 64 
 
                                                          
i
 Spanish interviewees were similarly pressed on what they meant by terms such as ‘desarrollar el negocio’, but were 
much more reticent in terms of figures. General economic conditions in Spain even pre-crisis would suggest that 
fee, profit and revenue levels per partner in the Spanish market be considerably lower than those quoted above, 
although this has not been corroborated. 
ii
 Interestingly, KPMG Europe has recently abandoned its European partnership model and reverted back to national 
partnerships, although partner earnings were always distributed in accordance with national performance in any 
case.  
